Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values


Kwiek, Maksymilian (2010) Reputation in multi-unit ascending auction with common values. Southampton, GB, University of Southampton, 21pp. (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 1012).

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Description/Abstract

This paper considers a multi-unit ascending auction with two players and common values. A large set of equilibria in this model is not robust to a small reputational perturbation. In particular, if there is a positive probability that there is a type who always demands many units, regardless of price, then the model has a unique equilibrium payoff profile. If this uncertainty is only on one side, then the player who is known to be normal lowers her demand in order to stop the auction immediately at the reserve price. Hence, her possibly committed opponent buys all the units she demands at the lowest possible price. If the reputation is on both sides, then a War of Attrition emerges.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
ISSNs: 0966-4246 (electronic)
Keywords: multi-unit auction, uniform price, ascending auction, reputation, aggressive bidding
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 161635
Date Deposited: 03 Aug 2010 09:23
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 19:16
Publisher: University of Southampton
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/161635

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