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Epistemic value and achievement

Epistemic value and achievement
Epistemic value and achievement
Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard’s explanation of understanding’s value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard’s is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state—whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever—by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.
216-230
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef

Whiting, Daniel (2012) Epistemic value and achievement. Ratio, 25 (2), 216-230. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00533.x).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard’s explanation of understanding’s value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard’s is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state—whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever—by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.

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Published date: 2012

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Local EPrints ID: 172571
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/172571
PURE UUID: e05ac685-d21c-4f86-8f1a-ff9854f7cdc9

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Date deposited: 09 Mar 2011 10:29
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 02:29

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