Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators, etc. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game” [Myerson, R., 1998. Population uncertainty and Poisson games. Int. J. Game Theory 27, 375–392; Myerson, R., 2000. Large Poisson games. J. Econ. Theory 94, 7–45]. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.
strategic complementarities, coordination games, poisson games, currency crises, innovation
180-189
Makris, Miltiadis
966df0dc-9caf-409e-9cbe-f2a800cdffda
January 2008
Makris, Miltiadis
966df0dc-9caf-409e-9cbe-f2a800cdffda
Makris, Miltiadis
(2008)
Complementarities and macroeconomics: Poisson games.
Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (1), .
(doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.001).
Abstract
In many situations in macroeconomics strategic complementarities arise, and agents face a coordination problem. An important issue, from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, is equilibrium uniqueness. We contribute to this literature by focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of the problem: the number of potential innovators, speculators, etc. is large. In particular, we follow Myerson that in large games “a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game” [Myerson, R., 1998. Population uncertainty and Poisson games. Int. J. Game Theory 27, 375–392; Myerson, R., 2000. Large Poisson games. J. Econ. Theory 94, 7–45]. In more detail, we model the coordination problem as a Poisson game, and investigate the conditions under which unique equilibrium selection is obtained.
This record has no associated files available for download.
More information
Published date: January 2008
Keywords:
strategic complementarities, coordination games, poisson games, currency crises, innovation
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 173925
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/173925
ISSN: 0899-8256
PURE UUID: ef807e5c-5893-46a8-8f6a-81f4867d5843
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 09 Feb 2011 09:31
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 02:32
Export record
Altmetrics
Contributors
Author:
Miltiadis Makris
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics