Nothing but the truth: on the norms and aims of belief
Whiting, Daniel (2012) Nothing but the truth: on the norms and aims of belief. In, Chan, Timothy (ed.) The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB, Oxford University Press. (In Press).
That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to the take the apparent platitude at face value.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Humanities > Philosophy
|Date Deposited:||06 May 2011 13:51|
|Last Modified:||07 Mar 2012 09:25|
|Contributors:||Whiting, Daniel (Author)
Chan, Timothy (Editor)
|Date:||1 March 2012|
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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