Nothing but the truth: on the norms and aims of belief
Nothing but the truth: on the norms and aims of belief
That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to the take the apparent platitude at face value.
978-0-19-967213-4
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
2013
Whiting, Daniel
c0847bb4-963e-470d-92a2-5c8aae5d5aef
Whiting, Daniel
(2013)
Nothing but the truth: on the norms and aims of belief.
In,
Chan, Timothy
(ed.)
The Aim of Belief.
Oxford, GB.
Oxford University Press.
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
That truth provides the standard for believing appears to be a platitude, one which dovetails with the idea that in some sense belief aims only at the truth. In recent years, however, an increasing number of prominent philosophers have suggested that knowledge provides the standard for believing, and so that belief aims only at knowledge. In this paper, I examine the considerations which have been put forward in support of this suggestion, considerations relating to lottery beliefs, Moorean beliefs, the criticism and defence of belief, and the value of knowledge. I argue that those considerations do not give us reason to give up the truth view in favour of the knowledge view and, moreover, that reflection on those considerations gives us some reason to reject the knowledge view. Thus, I conclude, we can continue to the take the apparent platitude at face value.
Text
Nothing_but_the_Truth_DJW_TheAimofBelief_Chan.pdf
- Author's Original
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy
Text
__soton.ac.uk_ude_personalfiles_users_dw1w07_mydesktop_WhitingAimofBelief.pdf
- Other
Restricted to Repository staff only
Request a copy
More information
Published date: 2013
Organisations:
Philosophy
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 184617
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/184617
ISBN: 978-0-19-967213-4
PURE UUID: a1ecf620-008c-49bb-852c-5cd6a4c3c58e
Catalogue record
Date deposited: 06 May 2011 13:51
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 03:09
Export record
Contributors
Editor:
Timothy Chan
Download statistics
Downloads from ePrints over the past year. Other digital versions may also be available to download e.g. from the publisher's website.
View more statistics