Belief and aims
McHugh, Conor (2011) Belief and aims. Philosophical Studies (doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9728-z).
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Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief’s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen’s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy
|Date Deposited:||06 Sep 2011 15:50|
|Last Modified:||19 Sep 2011 14:04|
|Contributors:||McHugh, Conor (Author)
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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