Belief and aims
McHugh, Conor (2011) Belief and aims. Philosophical Studies (doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9728-z).
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Description/Abstract
Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief’s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen’s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 0031-8116 (print) 1573-0883 (electronic) |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Item ID: | 196335 |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Sep 2011 15:50 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Sep 2011 14:04 |
| Contributors: | McHugh, Conor (Author) |
| Date: | 2011 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/196335 |
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