Unawareness of theorems
Galanis, Spyros (2013) Unawareness of theorems. Economic Theory, 52, (1), 41-73. (doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0683-x).
- Author's Original
This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent’s knowledge, but also can impair his reasoning about what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li (J Econ Theory 144:977–993, 2009), Heifetz et al. (J Econ Theory 130:78–94, 25 2006) and the standard model of knowledge, it is possible that two agents disagree on whether another agent knows a particular event. The model follows Aumann (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) in defining common knowledge and characterizing it in terms of a self-evident event, but departs in showing that no-trade theorems do not hold.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1007/s00199-011-0683-x|
|Additional Information:||This is a heavily revised version of the 2007 Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics paper.|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||16 Nov 2011 10:02|
|Last Modified:||27 Mar 2014 19:47|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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