Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world

McManus, Denis (2012) Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world. European Journal of Philosophy, 23, (2), 1-26. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00529.x).


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Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00529.x
ISSNs: 0966-8373 (print)
1468-0378 (electronic)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy
ePrint ID: 208895
Date :
Date Event
17 April 2012Made publicly available
June 2015Published
Date Deposited: 31 Jan 2012 12:23
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 13:49
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/208895

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