Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world
McManus, Denis (2012) Heidegger and the supposition of a single, objective world. European Journal of Philosophy, n/a, 1-26. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2012.00529.x).
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Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger's reflections on truth and understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger literature suggests (focusing, in particular, on work by John Haugeland), and offers what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ might be like.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy
|Date Deposited:||31 Jan 2012 12:23|
|Last Modified:||29 Aug 2014 13:51|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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