There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem (Abstract)


Harnad, Stevan (2001) There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem (Abstract). Journal of Psychology, 27(3-4, 521.

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Description/Abstract

In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of "intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: Presented at Symposium on the Perception of Intentionality, XXV World Congress of Psychology, Brussels, Belgium, July 1992
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science
ePrint ID: 256464
Date Deposited: 02 Apr 2002
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 19:58
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256464

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