There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem (Abstract)
Harnad, Stevan (2001) There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem (Abstract). Journal of Psychology, 27(3-4, 521.
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Description/Abstract
In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of "intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Presented at Symposium on the Perception of Intentionality, XXV World Congress of Psychology, Brussels, Belgium, July 1992 |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science |
| Item ID: | 256464 |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Apr 2002 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2012 10:47 |
| Contributors: | Harnad, Stevan (Author) |
| Date: | 2001 |
| Additional Information: | Presented at Symposium on the Perception of Intentionality, XXV World Congress of Psychology, Brussels, Belgium, July 1992 |
| Status: | Published |
| Further Information: | Google Scholar |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256464 |
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