Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem
Harnad, Stevan (2001) Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem.
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Description/Abstract
The mind/body problem is really just the feeling/function problem: How and why are some functional states felt states? Dan Dennett's instrumentalism addresses only function: It leaves feeling completely untouched. The feeling/function problem is not merely "hard," as Chalmers suggests: it is insoluble -- except on pain of a telekinetic dualism ("mind over matter") that assigns feeling a causal role that all empirical evidence contradicts.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Technical Report) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Quote/Comments on Dan Dennett's paper, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," based on his recent debate with Dave Chalmers about consciousness http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science |
| Item ID: | 256468 |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Apr 2002 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2012 10:47 |
| Contributors: | Harnad, Stevan (Author) |
| Date: | 2001 |
| Additional Information: | Quote/Comments on Dan Dennett's paper, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," based on his recent debate with Dave Chalmers about consciousness http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm |
| Status: | Published |
| Further Information: | Google Scholar |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256468 |
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