Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem


Harnad, Stevan (2001) Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem.

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Description/Abstract

The mind/body problem is really just the feeling/function problem: How and why are some functional states felt states? Dan Dennett's instrumentalism addresses only function: It leaves feeling completely untouched. The feeling/function problem is not merely "hard," as Chalmers suggests: it is insoluble -- except on pain of a telekinetic dualism ("mind over matter") that assigns feeling a causal role that all empirical evidence contradicts.

Item Type: Monograph (Technical Report)
Additional Information: Quote/Comments on Dan Dennett's paper, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," based on his recent debate with Dave Chalmers about consciousness http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science
ePrint ID: 256468
Date Deposited: 02 Apr 2002
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 19:58
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/256468

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