Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem
Harnad, Stevan (2001) Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness: The Mind/Body Problem is the Feeling/Function Problem.
The mind/body problem is really just the feeling/function problem: How and why are some functional states felt states? Dan Dennett's instrumentalism addresses only function: It leaves feeling completely untouched. The feeling/function problem is not merely "hard," as Chalmers suggests: it is insoluble -- except on pain of a telekinetic dualism ("mind over matter") that assigns feeling a causal role that all empirical evidence contradicts.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Technical Report)|
|Additional Information:||Quote/Comments on Dan Dennett's paper, "The Fantasy of First-Person Science," based on his recent debate with Dave Chalmers about consciousness http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm|
|Divisions :||Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science
|Accepted Date and Publication Date:||
|Date Deposited:||02 Apr 2002|
|Last Modified:||31 Mar 2016 13:56|
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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