A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations
Dash, R. K., Rogers, A. and Jennings, N. R. (2004) A mechanism for multiple goods and interdependent valuations. In, Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A. and Faratin, Peyman (eds.) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, AMEC 2004, New York, NY, USA, July 19, 2004, Revised Selected Papers. 6th International Workshop on Agent-Mediated E-Commerce (AMEC VI) , Springer, 15-29. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).
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Description/Abstract
This paper reports on the design of an auction mechanism for allocating multiple goods when the buyers have interdependent valuations. We cast the problem as a multi-agent system consisting of selfish, rational agents and develop an auction mechanism which is efficient, incentive compatible and individually rational.We first discuss the necessary assumptions that any mechanism developed for this scenario should satisfy so as to achieve the aforementioned properties. We then present our mechanism and show how it is a generalisation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Event Dates: 2004 |
| ISBNs: | 3540297375 |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity |
| Item ID: | 259551 |
| Date Deposited: | 29 Jul 2004 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Mar 2012 14:02 |
| Contributors: | Dash, R. K. (Author) Rogers, A. (Author) Jennings, N. R. (Author) Rodríguez-Aguilar, Juan A. (Editor) Faratin, Peyman (Editor) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| Additional Information: | Event Dates: 2004 |
| Status: | Published |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| Further Information: | Google Scholar |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/259551 |
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