On the Incommensurability of Feeling and Doing: The Illusion of Free Will. (Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.)
Harnad, Stevan (2003) On the Incommensurability of Feeling and Doing: The Illusion of Free Will. (Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press.).
![[file icon]](http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text_html.png) | HTML 33Kb |
![[file icon]](http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_msword.png) | Microsoft Word 22Kb |
![[file icon]](http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png) | PDF 61Kb |
Description/Abstract
Wegner’s book is on perceptual and motor illusions of free well and agency, but free will is much more profoundly illusory than any of the phenomena reported in his book. We never do anything because we feel like it, even it is feels as if we do, because feelings cannot have any independent causal power, on pain of telekinetic dualism.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Technical Report) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Review of: Wegner, Daniel (2003) The Illusion of Conscious Will. MIT Press. Multiply reviewed in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2004) 27: 649-692 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | consciousness, free will, causation, explanation, correlation, volition, movement, agency |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Web & Internet Science |
| ePrint ID: | 263811 |
| Deposited On: | 29 Mar 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Mar 2012 20:36 |
| Further Information: | Google Scholar |
Associated Staff Only: edit my ePrint
