Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games
Elkind, Edith, Goldberg, Leslie Ann, Goldberg, Paul W. and Wooldridge, Michael (2007) Computational Complexity of Weighted Threshold Games. In, Twenty-Second Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07), Vancouver, BC, 22 - 26 Jul 2007.
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Description/Abstract
Weighted threshold games are coalitional games in which each player has a weight (intuitively corresponding to its voting power), and a coalition is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given threshold. Key questions in coalitional games include finding coalitions that are stable (in the sense that no member of the coalition has any rational incentive to leave it), and finding a division of payoffs to coalition members (an imputation) that is fair. We investigate the computational complexity of such questions for weighted threshold games. We study the \emph{core}, the \emph{least core}, and the \emph{nucleolus}, distinguishing those problems that are polynomial-time computable from those that are NP-hard, and providing pseudopolynomial and approximation algorithms for the NP-hard problems.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Event Dates: July 22 - Jully 26, 2007 |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science |
| Item ID: | 264315 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Jul 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Mar 2012 11:40 |
| Contributors: | Elkind, Edith (Author) Goldberg, Leslie Ann (Author) Goldberg, Paul W. (Author) Wooldridge, Michael (Author) |
| Date: | 2007 |
| Additional Information: | Event Dates: July 22 - Jully 26, 2007 |
| Status: | Published |
| Further Information: | Google Scholar |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/264315 |
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