Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting
Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
129-142
Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
2006
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
Somefun, D.J.A.
3667271d-f167-40b0-9b82-7f393324262b
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
Gerding, E.H., Somefun, D.J.A. and La Poutre, J.A.
(2006)
Multi-Attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting.
In,
Faratin, Peyman and Rodriguez-Aguilar, Juan A.
(eds.)
Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VI, Springer Lecture Notes in AI, vol. 3435.
Springer Berlin, Heidelberg, .
Record type:
Book Section
Abstract
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
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Published date: 2006
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 265623
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265623
PURE UUID: d471f44e-cf02-4168-b505-9cd14bae4955
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Date deposited: 28 Apr 2008 14:26
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
E.H. Gerding
Author:
D.J.A. Somefun
Author:
J.A. La Poutre
Editor:
Peyman Faratin
Editor:
Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar
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