Bargaining with Posterior Opportunities: An Evolutionary Social Simulation
Bargaining with Posterior Opportunities: An Evolutionary Social Simulation
Negotiations have been extensively studied theoretically throughout the years. A well-known bilateral approach is the ultimatum game, where two agents negotiate on how to split a pie or a "dollar": the proposer makes an offer and responder can choose to accept or reject. In this paper a natural extension of the ultimatum game is presented, in which both agents can negotiate with other opponents in case of a disagreement. This way the basics of a competitive market are modeled where for instance a buyer can try several sellers before making a purchase decision. The game is investigated using an evolutionary simulation. The outcomes appear to depend largely on the information available to the agents. We find that if the agents' number of future bargaining opportunities is commonly known, the proposer has the advantage. If this information is held private, however, the responder can obtain a larger share of the pie. For the first case we also provide a game-theoretic analysis and compare the outcome with evolutionary results. Furthermore, the effects of search costs and allowing multiple issues to be negotiated simultaneously are investigated.
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
2004
Gerding, E.H.
d9e92ee5-1a8c-4467-a689-8363e7743362
La Poutre, J.A.
31ffa5ed-a4a3-40d7-ac47-db7a375d95ae
Gerding, E.H. and La Poutre, J.A.
(2004)
Bargaining with Posterior Opportunities: An Evolutionary Social Simulation.
In,
Gallegati, M., Kirman, A.P. and Marsili, M.
(eds.)
The Complex Dynamics of Economic Interaction, Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems.
Springer.
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Book Section
Abstract
Negotiations have been extensively studied theoretically throughout the years. A well-known bilateral approach is the ultimatum game, where two agents negotiate on how to split a pie or a "dollar": the proposer makes an offer and responder can choose to accept or reject. In this paper a natural extension of the ultimatum game is presented, in which both agents can negotiate with other opponents in case of a disagreement. This way the basics of a competitive market are modeled where for instance a buyer can try several sellers before making a purchase decision. The game is investigated using an evolutionary simulation. The outcomes appear to depend largely on the information available to the agents. We find that if the agents' number of future bargaining opportunities is commonly known, the proposer has the advantage. If this information is held private, however, the responder can obtain a larger share of the pie. For the first case we also provide a game-theoretic analysis and compare the outcome with evolutionary results. Furthermore, the effects of search costs and allowing multiple issues to be negotiated simultaneously are investigated.
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Published date: 2004
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 265632
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265632
PURE UUID: 2560829b-424c-4704-bb0e-f71a6e3f1e52
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Date deposited: 28 Apr 2008 15:29
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 03:23
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Contributors
Author:
E.H. Gerding
Author:
J.A. La Poutre
Editor:
M. Gallegati
Editor:
A.P. Kirman
Editor:
M. Marsili
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