Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions


Vetsikas, Ioannis A. and Jennings, Nicholas R. (2008) Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions. In, 23rd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), Chicago, USA, 13 - 17 Jul 2008. , 182-189.

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Description/Abstract

When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of these issues have been examined individually for single-unit sealed-bid auctions. In this paper, we extend this analysis to the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid auctions in which a combination of these issues are present, for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal reserve price. Introduction

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information: Event Dates: July 13-17, 2008
Divisions: Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
Item ID: 265652
Date Deposited: 29 Apr 2008 16:14
Last Modified: 01 Mar 2012 18:36
Contributors: Vetsikas, Ioannis A. (Author)
Jennings, Nicholas R. (Author)
Date: 15 April 2008
Additional Information: Event Dates: July 13-17, 2008
Status: Published
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/265652

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