Gerding, Enrico, Rogers, Alex, Larson, Kate and Jennings, Nick
Mechanism Design for Task Procurement with Flexible Quality of Service.
At 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Budapest,
10 - 15 May 2009.
In this paper, we consider the problem faced by an agent contracting multiple self-interested service providers, that are able to flexibly manipulate their quality of service in order to maximise their own utility, to complete a single computational task. We extend an existing model of such service providers, and derive optimal task procurement mechanisms in the setting where the agent has full knowledge of the cost functions of these service providers (considering both simultaneously and sequentially procurement). We then extend these results to the incomplete information setting where the agent must elicit cost information from the service providers, and we characterise a family of incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. Sequential procurement always generates greater utility for an agent than simultaneous procurement, and contracting multiple providers is preferable to contracting just one.
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Mechanism Design for Task Procurement with Flexible Quality of Service. (deposited 02 Mar 2009 22:21)
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