Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources
Penn, Michal, Polukarov, Maria and Tennenholtz, Moshe (2009) Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources. Games and Economic Behavior, 67, (1), 156-173.
- Accepted Version
We define a new class of games---congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs). In a CGLF each player can choose a subset of a set of available resources in order to try and perform his task. We assume that the resources are identical but that players' benefits from successful completion of their tasks may differ. Each resource is associated with a cost of use and failure probability which are load-dependent. Although CGLFs in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.
|Divisions:||Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
|Date Deposited:||16 Sep 2009 19:59|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 11:59|
|Contributors:||Penn, Michal (Author)
Polukarov, Maria (Author)
Tennenholtz, Moshe (Author)
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
|ISI Citation Count:||5|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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