What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms


Niu, Jinzhong, Cai, Kai, Parsons, Simon, McBurney, Peter and Gerding, Enrico H. (2010) What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 21, (2), 172-203. (doi:10.1007/s10458-009-9110-0).

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Description/Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 1387-2532 (print)
1573-7454 (electronic)
Keywords: double auction, mechanism design, trading agent competition
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 268531
Date Deposited: 21 Feb 2010 17:52
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 20:15
Publisher: Springer
Further Information:Google Scholar
ISI Citation Count:5
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/268531

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