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Asynchronous congestion games

Asynchronous congestion games
Asynchronous congestion games
We introduce a new class of games, asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms - the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.
41-53|xiv+227
Penn, M.
70567020-c894-424a-ba34-b1905e1b20e5
Polukarov, M.
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, M.
855b23d7-ec7c-4e51-b240-5dca7910a456
Penn, M.
70567020-c894-424a-ba34-b1905e1b20e5
Polukarov, M.
bd2f0623-9e8a-465f-8b29-851387a64740
Tennenholtz, M.
855b23d7-ec7c-4e51-b240-5dca7910a456

Penn, M., Polukarov, M. and Tennenholtz, M. (2009) Asynchronous congestion games. Graph Theory, Computational Intelligence and Thought. Essays Dedicated to Martin Charles Golumbic on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, 41-53|xiv+227.

Record type: Article

Abstract

We introduce a new class of games, asynchronous congestion games (ACGs). In an ACG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. Each player's aim is to minimize his expected cost which is the sum of two terms - the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ACGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ACG.

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Published date: 2009
Additional Information: Imported from ISI Web of Science
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

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Local EPrints ID: 270585
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/270585
PURE UUID: 4a5533ea-b3a1-4903-ae87-5f049b36c573

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Date deposited: 21 Apr 2010 07:46
Last modified: 08 Jan 2022 11:53

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Contributors

Author: M. Penn
Author: M. Polukarov
Author: M. Tennenholtz

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