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Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities

Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the value of any coalition is independent of other coalitions in the system. However, externalities play a key role in many real-life situations and have been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and economic literature. In this paper, we consider the issue of computing extensions of the Shapley value to coalitional games with externalities proposed by Myerson [21], Pham Do and Norde [23], and McQuillin [17]. To facilitate efficient computation of these extensions, we propose a new representation for coalitional games with externalities, which is based on weighted logical expressions. We demonstrate that this representation is fully expressive and, sometimes, exponentially more concise than the conventional partition function game model. Furthermore, it allows us to compute the aforementioned extensions of the Shapley value in time linear in the size of the input.
197-202
Michalak, Tomasz
e24bfee3-bd75-4cca-8220-6f3c2f39dc38
Rahwan, Talal
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Marciniak, Dorota
d0b32747-f004-41a8-b048-23a666ced9d1
Szamotulski, Marcin
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Jennings, Nicholas
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30
Michalak, Tomasz
e24bfee3-bd75-4cca-8220-6f3c2f39dc38
Rahwan, Talal
476029f3-5484-4747-9f44-f63f3687083c
Marciniak, Dorota
d0b32747-f004-41a8-b048-23a666ced9d1
Szamotulski, Marcin
0430f487-9884-4a66-a9d4-b6f3da10c8a9
Jennings, Nicholas
ab3d94cc-247c-4545-9d1e-65873d6cdb30

Michalak, Tomasz, Rahwan, Talal, Marciniak, Dorota, Szamotulski, Marcin and Jennings, Nicholas (2010) Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities. European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), Lisbon, Portugal. pp. 197-202 .

Record type: Conference or Workshop Item (Other)

Abstract

Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the value of any coalition is independent of other coalitions in the system. However, externalities play a key role in many real-life situations and have been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and economic literature. In this paper, we consider the issue of computing extensions of the Shapley value to coalitional games with externalities proposed by Myerson [21], Pham Do and Norde [23], and McQuillin [17]. To facilitate efficient computation of these extensions, we propose a new representation for coalitional games with externalities, which is based on weighted logical expressions. We demonstrate that this representation is fully expressive and, sometimes, exponentially more concise than the conventional partition function game model. Furthermore, it allows us to compute the aforementioned extensions of the Shapley value in time linear in the size of the input.

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Published date: 2010
Venue - Dates: European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI), Lisbon, Portugal, 2010-01-01
Organisations: Agents, Interactions & Complexity

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 271218
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/271218
PURE UUID: 4088eb6e-0230-4c23-b2d5-722558703eca

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Date deposited: 04 Jun 2010 09:44
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 09:25

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Contributors

Author: Tomasz Michalak
Author: Talal Rahwan
Author: Dorota Marciniak
Author: Marcin Szamotulski
Author: Nicholas Jennings

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