Automated Planning in Repeated Adversarial Games


Munoz de Cote, Enrique, Chapman, Archie, Sykulski, Adam M. and Jennings, Nick (2010) Automated Planning in Repeated Adversarial Games. At 26th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2010), Catalina Island, California, USA, 08 - 11 Jul 2010. , 376-383.

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Description/Abstract

Game theory's prescriptive power typically relies on full rationality and/or self-play interactions. In contrast, this work sets aside these fundamental premises and focuses instead on heterogeneous autonomous interactions between two or more agents. Specifically, we introduce a new and concise representation for repeated adversarial (constant-sum) games that highlight the necessary features that enable an automated planing agent to reason about how to score above the game's Nash equilibrium, when facing heterogeneous adversaries. To this end, we present TeamUP, a model-based RL algorithm designed for learning and planning such an abstraction. In essence, it is somewhat similar to R-max with a cleverly engineered reward shaping that treats exploration as an adversarial optimization problem. In practice, it attempts to find an ally with which to tacitly collude (in more than two-player games) and then collaborates on a joint plan of actions that can consistently score a high utility in adversarial repeated games. We use the inaugural Lemonade Stand Game Tournament to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, and find that TeamUP is the best performing agent, demoting the Tournament's actual winning strategy into second place. In our experimental analysis, we show hat our strategy successfully and consistently builds collaborations with many different heterogeneous (and sometimes very sophisticated) adversaries.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Speech)
Additional Information: Event Dates: 8-11 July, 2010
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 271306
Date Deposited: 25 Jun 2010 10:12
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 20:16
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/271306

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