Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders

Fatima, Shaheen, Wooldridge, M and Jennings, Nick (2010) Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders. Int. Journal of Multiagent and Grid Systems, 6, (5), 403-414.


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This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the bidders’ problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior of bidders and determines the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in individual auctions in a series.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 271610
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2010 18:13
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:19
Further Information:Google Scholar

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