Constrained coalition formation


Rahwan, Talal, Michalak , Tomasz, Elkind, Edith, Faliszewski, Piotr, Sroka, Jacek, Wooldridge, Michael and Jennings, Nicholas (2011) Constrained coalition formation. At Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San Francisco, US, 07 - 11 Aug 2011. AAAI, 719-725.

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Description/Abstract

The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of constrained coalition formation (CCF). We propose a general framework for this problem, and identify an important class of CCF settings, where the constraints specify which groups of agents should/should not work together. We describe a procedure that transforms such constraints into a structured input that allows coalition formation algorithms to identify, without any redundant computations, all the feasible coalitions. We then use this procedure to develop an algorithm for generating an optimal (welfare-maximizing) constrained coalition structure, and show that it outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by several orders of magnitude.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Speech)
ISBNs: 9781577355076 (hardback)
Related URLs:
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 272269
Date Deposited: 11 May 2011 07:55
Last Modified: 14 Apr 2014 11:35
Research Funder: EPSRC
Projects:
HUMAN-AGENT COLLECTIVES: FROM FOUNDATIONS TO APPLICATIONS [ORCHID]
Funded by: EPSRC (EP/I011587/1)
Led by: Nick Jennings
1 January 2011 to 31 December 2015
Publisher: AAAI
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272269

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