Software Agents in Multiple Adaptive Double Auction Markets
Software Agents in Multiple Adaptive Double Auction Markets
The prevalence of on-line auctions has stimulated the interest of both the economists and computer scientists in an effort to understand and improve their rules. One famous form of these economic mechanisms is the double auction and, more specifically, the continuous double auction which is commonly used in today’s major stock exchanges worldwide. Software agents constitute a promising tool for the study and implementation of novel double auction mechanisms. TAC Market Design tournament makes an attempt to study the competition among such dynamically adjusted market institutions trying to attract potential traders while maximizing their profit. In this paper we describe the tournament and discuss about the importance of the global competitive equilibrium in its economy. Moreover, we provide a simple, yet effective estimation technique for the latter that our entrant, Mertacor, has utilized during the games of 2008.
Double Auction, Market Design, Trading Agent Competition
978-0-7695-3788-7
48-52
Stavrogiannis, Lampros C.
08655c3e-a334-4bec-a8a6-3acce9d6ee5b
Mitkas, Pericles A.
119cd47e-a562-44f2-b510-39d18d3c8810
Chrissikopoulos, Vassilios
c81f7a83-c4f5-4b37-880b-3f1614e9e179
Alexandris, Nikolaos
16197470-c897-4326-bd2f-249e9c124596
Douligeris, Christos
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Sioutas, Spyros
60d11988-9bc9-4f90-b4f1-3e6031fdc925
September 2009
Stavrogiannis, Lampros C.
08655c3e-a334-4bec-a8a6-3acce9d6ee5b
Mitkas, Pericles A.
119cd47e-a562-44f2-b510-39d18d3c8810
Chrissikopoulos, Vassilios
c81f7a83-c4f5-4b37-880b-3f1614e9e179
Alexandris, Nikolaos
16197470-c897-4326-bd2f-249e9c124596
Douligeris, Christos
10ec71c2-f626-4620-ac93-48bece39519f
Sioutas, Spyros
60d11988-9bc9-4f90-b4f1-3e6031fdc925
Stavrogiannis, Lampros C. and Mitkas, Pericles A.
(2009)
Software Agents in Multiple Adaptive Double Auction Markets.
Chrissikopoulos, Vassilios, Alexandris, Nikolaos, Douligeris, Christos and Sioutas, Spyros
(eds.)
13th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics, Corfu, Greece.
10 - 12 Sep 2009.
.
Record type:
Conference or Workshop Item
(Paper)
Abstract
The prevalence of on-line auctions has stimulated the interest of both the economists and computer scientists in an effort to understand and improve their rules. One famous form of these economic mechanisms is the double auction and, more specifically, the continuous double auction which is commonly used in today’s major stock exchanges worldwide. Software agents constitute a promising tool for the study and implementation of novel double auction mechanisms. TAC Market Design tournament makes an attempt to study the competition among such dynamically adjusted market institutions trying to attract potential traders while maximizing their profit. In this paper we describe the tournament and discuss about the importance of the global competitive equilibrium in its economy. Moreover, we provide a simple, yet effective estimation technique for the latter that our entrant, Mertacor, has utilized during the games of 2008.
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More information
Published date: September 2009
Additional Information:
Event Dates: 10-12 September 2009
Venue - Dates:
13th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics, Corfu, Greece, 2009-09-10 - 2009-09-12
Keywords:
Double Auction, Market Design, Trading Agent Competition
Organisations:
Agents, Interactions & Complexity, Electronics & Computer Science
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 272367
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272367
ISBN: 978-0-7695-3788-7
PURE UUID: 963624fd-9ec7-4786-bce7-477d31b7e0db
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Date deposited: 30 May 2011 13:06
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 10:00
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Contributors
Author:
Lampros C. Stavrogiannis
Author:
Pericles A. Mitkas
Editor:
Vassilios Chrissikopoulos
Editor:
Nikolaos Alexandris
Editor:
Christos Douligeris
Editor:
Spyros Sioutas
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