The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes
Brede, Markus (2011) The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes. Artificial Life, 17, (4), Autumn Issue, 365-373. (doi:10.1162/artl_a_00044).
- Version of Record
Restricted to Registered users only
We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game on time-invariant heterogeneous payoff landscapes on regular and heterogeneous networks. Correlations in the landscape structure and their implications for the evolution of cooperation are investigated. On regular networks we find that negatively and neutrally correlated payoff landscapes strongly enhance cooperation, while positively correlated landscapes may suppress the evolution of cooperation. On heterogeneous networks, cooperation is facilitated if payoff stochasticity is positively correlated with network heterogeneity and may be suppressed otherwise.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1162/artl_a_00044|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
|Date Deposited:||26 Sep 2011 16:27|
|Last Modified:||27 Mar 2014 20:18|
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
|ISI Citation Count:||3|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
Actions (login required)