The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes

Brede, Markus (2011) The evolution of cooperation on correlated payoff landscapes. Artificial Life, 17, (4), Autumn Issue, 365-373. (doi:10.1162/artl_a_00044).


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We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner?s dilemma game on time-invariant heterogeneous payoff landscapes on regular and heterogeneous networks. Correlations in the landscape structure and their implications for the evolution of cooperation are investigated. On regular networks we find that negatively and neutrally correlated payoff landscapes strongly enhance cooperation, while positively correlated landscapes may suppress the evolution of cooperation. On heterogeneous networks, cooperation is facilitated if payoff stochasticity is positively correlated with network heterogeneity and may be suppressed otherwise.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1162/artl_a_00044
ISSNs: 1064-5462 (print)
1530-9185 (electronic)
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions : Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 272861
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
19 September 2011Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2011 16:27
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:22
Further Information:Google Scholar

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