The prisoner's dilemma with image scoring on networks: How does a player's strategy depend on its place in the social network?


Brede, Markus (2007) The prisoner's dilemma with image scoring on networks: How does a player's strategy depend on its place in the social network? In, 3rd Australian Conference on Artificial Life, Gold Coast, AUSTRALIA, 04 - 06 Dec 2007. Springer-Verlag, 222-231.

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Description/Abstract

We investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma on different types of interaction networks. Agents interact with their network neighbours. An agent is classified by a value S is an element of [-1, 1] denoting its strategy and by its image score. It will cooperate if the opponents relative image score is above S and defect otherwise. Agents spread their strategies to their network neighbours proportionally to payoff differences. We find that network topology strongly influences the average cooperation rate; networks with low degree variance allowing for the largest amount of cooperation. In heterogeneous networks an agents place in the network strongly influences its strategy. Thus, agents on hub nodes are found to 'police' the population, while being on low degree nodes tends to favour over-generous less discriminating strategies.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information: Event Dates: DEC 04-06, 2007
ISBNs: 9783540769309
ISSNs: 0302-9743
Divisions: Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 272887
Date Deposited: 29 Sep 2011 16:19
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 20:18
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Further Information:Google Scholar
ISI Citation Count:0
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/272887

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