A Scoring Rule-Based Mechanism for Aggregate Demand Prediction in the Smart Grid

Rose, Harry, Rogers, Alex and Gerding, Enrico H. (2012) A Scoring Rule-Based Mechanism for Aggregate Demand Prediction in the Smart Grid. In, The 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2012), Valencia, Spain, 8pp, 661-668.


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This paper presents a novel scoring rule-based strictly dominant incentive compatible mechanism that encourages agents to produce costly estimates of future events and report them truthfully to a centre. Whereas prior work has assumed a fixed budget for payment towards agents, this work makes use of prior information held by the centre and assumes a budget that is determined by the savings made through the use of the agents' information over the centre's own prior information. This mechanism is compared to a simple benchmark mechanism wherein the savings are divided equally among all home agents, and a cooperative solution wherein agents act to maximise social welfare. Empirical analysis is performed in which the mechanism is applied to a simulation of the smart grid whereby an aggregator agent must use home agents' information to optimally purchase electricity. It is shown that this mechanism achieves up to 77% of the social welfare achieved by the cooperative solution.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Divisions : Faculty of Physical Sciences and Engineering > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
ePrint ID: 273139
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
June 2012Published
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2012 14:39
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:22
Intelligent Agents for Home Energy Management
Funded by: EPSRC (EP/I000143/1)
Led by: Alexander Carl Rogers
1 November 2010 to 31 March 2014
Further Information:Google Scholar
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/273139

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