Overlapping Coalition Formation Games: Charting the Tractability Frontier
Zick, Yair, Chalkiadakis, Georgios and Elkind, Edith (2012) Overlapping Coalition Formation Games: Charting the Tractability Frontier. In, Proc. 11th Int. Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), Valencia, Spain,
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Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions (OCF games) model scenarios where agents can distribute their resources among several tasks; each task generates a profit which may be freely divided among the agents participating in the task. The goal of this work is to initiate a systematic investigation of algorithmic aspects of OCF games. We propose a discretized model of overlapping coalition formation, where each agent i in N has a weight and may allocate an integer amount of resources to any task. Within this framework, we focus on the computation of outcomes that are socially optimal and/or stable. We discover that the algorithmic complexity of the associated problems crucially depends on the amount of resources that each agent possesses, the maximum coalition size, and the pattern of interaction among the agents. We identify several constraints that lead to tractable subclasses of OCF games, and provide efficient algorithms for games that belong to these subclasses. We supplement our tractability results by hardness proofs, which clarify the role of our constraints.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Physical and Applied Science > Electronics and Computer Science > Agents, Interactions & Complexity
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2012 18:26|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 12:00|
|Contributors:||Zick, Yair (Author)
Chalkiadakis, Georgios (Author)
Elkind, Edith (Author)
|Further Information:||Google Scholar|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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