Proportional representation with citizen candidates
Hamlin, Alan and Hjortlund, Michael (2000) Proportional representation with citizen candidates. Public Choice, 103, (3-4), 205-230. (doi:10.1023/A:1005086519491).
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We construct a simple model incorporating both citizen-candidates and proportional representation and investigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and pure policy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as a candidate and allows explicit study of the number andt ype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea of proportional representation allows a more flexible relationship between the pattern of votes cast and the final policy outcome, and also provides a richer model of political representation. Our discussion points to the widespread possibility of equilibria involving non-median policy outcomes;provides insights into the relationship between proportional representation and the equilibrium number of candidates; and also provides an explicit account of the trade-off between candidate benefits distributed on a winner-take-all basis and those tha tare mediated through proportional representation
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1023/A:1005086519491|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||18 Jul 2006|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:30|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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