Proportional representation with citizen candidates
Hamlin, Alan and Hjortlund, Michael (2000) Proportional representation with citizen candidates. Public Choice, 103, (3-4), 205-230. (doi:10.1023/A:1005086519491).
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Description/Abstract
We construct a simple model incorporating both citizen-candidates and proportional representation and investigate its properties in a basic case with auniform distribution of citizen ideal points and pure policy motivations, and in further cases which allowof office rents and other distributions ofpreferences. The idea of citizen-candidates, developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate(1997), endogenises the decision to stand as a candidate and allows explicit study of the number andt ype of candidates as an equilibrium phenomenon. The idea of proportional representation allows a more flexible relationship between the pattern of votes cast and the final policy outcome, and also provides a richer model of political representation. Our discussion points to the widespread possibility of equilibria involving non-median policy outcomes;provides insights into the relationship between proportional representation and the equilibrium number of candidates; and also provides an explicit account of the trade-off between candidate benefits distributed on a winner-take-all basis and those tha tare mediated through proportional representation
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 0048-5829 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 32944 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jul 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Apr 2013 13:09 |
| Contributors: | Hamlin, Alan (Author) Hjortlund, Michael (Author) |
| Date: | June 2000 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32944 |
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