Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium
Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan (1998) Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice, 95, (1-2), 149-175. (doi:10.1023/A:1004936203144).
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Description/Abstract
There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options, rather like cheering at a football match. This paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium, and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account. We also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting, and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the cover date. |
| ISSNs: | 0048-5829 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 32947 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Nov 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 25 Apr 2013 13:09 |
| Contributors: | Brennan, Geoffrey (Author) Hamlin, Alan (Author) |
| Date: | 1998 |
| Additional Information: | This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the cover date. |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32947 |
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