Rationalizing parliamentary systems
Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan (1993) Rationalizing parliamentary systems. Australian Journal of Political Science, 28, (3), 443-457. (doi:10.1080/00323269308402253).
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Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions focuses on the issues that are most salient under US constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer different institutional arrangements and different challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition and disciplined political parties, while also offering a discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of representative, responsible government in which disciplined political parties are often seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1080/00323269308402253|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||11 Dec 2007|
|Last Modified:||31 Mar 2016 11:59|
Constitutional political economy
Funded by: ESRC (R000233782)
1 January 1993 to 31 December 1994
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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