Rationalizing parliamentary systems


Brennan, Geoffrey and Hamlin, Alan (1993) Rationalizing parliamentary systems. Australian Journal of Political Science, 28, (3), 443-457. (doi:10.1080/00323269308402253).

Download

Full text not available from this repository.

Description/Abstract

Public Choice analysis of democratic political institutions focuses on the issues that are most salient under US constitutional arrangements. Parliamentary systems offer different institutional arrangements and different challenges to the Public Choice approach. We outline a Public Choice account of parliamentary democracy which concentrates attention on the roles of electoral competition and disciplined political parties, while also offering a discussion of parliamentary procedure. The Public Choice approach is contrasted with the mainstream view of representative, responsible government in which disciplined political parties are often seen as a threat to parliamentary democracy.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 1036-1146 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 32953
Date Deposited: 11 Dec 2007
Last Modified: 14 Apr 2014 09:27
Research Funder: ESRC
Projects:
Unknown (R000233782)
Funded by: ESRC (R000233782)
UNSPECIFIED to UNSPECIFIED
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32953

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item