Path-dependence and learning from neighbors
Anderlini, L. and Ianni, A. (1996) Path-dependence and learning from neighbors. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, (2), 141-177. (doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032).
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We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategic complementarities, with one of their “neighbors” selected at random. Because of the endogenous nature of experimentation, or “noise,” the systems we study exhibit a high degree of path dependence. Different actions of a pure coordination game may survive in the long-run at different locations of the system. A reinterpretation of our results shows that the local nature of search may be a robust reason for price dispersion in a search model.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||05 Jul 2007|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:30|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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