Path-dependence and learning from neighbors
Anderlini, L. and Ianni, A. (1996) Path-dependence and learning from neighbors. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, (2), 141-177. (doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032).
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Description/Abstract
We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategic complementarities, with one of their “neighbors” selected at random. Because of the endogenous nature of experimentation, or “noise,” the systems we study exhibit a high degree of path dependence. Different actions of a pure coordination game may survive in the long-run at different locations of the system. A reinterpretation of our results shows that the local nature of search may be a robust reason for price dispersion in a search model.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 0899-8256 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HA Statistics |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 32966 |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Jul 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2011 11:30 |
| Contributors: | Anderlini, L. (Author) Ianni, A. (Author) |
| Date: | 1996 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32966 |
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