Path-dependence and learning from neighbors


Anderlini, L. and Ianni, A. (1996) Path-dependence and learning from neighbors. Games and Economic Behavior, 13, (2), 141-177. (doi:10.1006/game.1996.0032).

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Original Publication URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0032

Description/Abstract

We study the long-run properties of a class of locally interactive learning systems. A finite set of players at fixed locations play a two-by-two symmetric normal form game with strategic complementarities, with one of their “neighbors” selected at random. Because of the endogenous nature of experimentation, or “noise,” the systems we study exhibit a high degree of path dependence. Different actions of a pure coordination game may survive in the long-run at different locations of the system. A reinterpretation of our results shows that the local nature of search may be a robust reason for price dispersion in a search model.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 0899-8256 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 32966
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2007
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32966

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