The optimal suppression of a low-cost technology by a durable-good monopoly


Karp, L. and Perloff, J.M. (1996) The optimal suppression of a low-cost technology by a durable-good monopoly. The Rand Journal of Economics, 27, (2), 346-364.

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Description/Abstract

If a durable-good monopoly can use either of two technologies whose properties are known to consumers, the monopoly uses only the technology with the lowest average cost at low levels of production. If consumers know only about technologies in use, the monopoly may use an inferior technology initially to increase its profits, keeping the new, efficient technology secret and switching later. Thus, in either case, an inferior technology may be used; however, switching between technologies occurs only if consumers are not fully informed about both technologies.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 0741-6261 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: T Technology > T Technology (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 32969
Date Deposited: 28 Jun 2007
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/32969

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