Labour-managed firms and monopsony power
Stewart, Geoff (1984) Labour-managed firms and monopsony power. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2, (1), 63-74. (doi:10.1016/0167-7187(84)90033-X).
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Monopsony power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisons between an Illyrian labour-managed firm (LMF) and a profit-maximising capitalist firm (CF) operating in the same markets with the same technology. If the CF earns positive profits then workers earn more in the LMF than in the CF, and the level of employment in the LMF may be higher or lower than in the CF. Monopsony power is also seen to have interesting implications for models of membership contraction in LMFs.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||12 Dec 2007|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 12:05|
|Contributors:||Stewart, Geoff (Author)
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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