Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
Ulph, Alistair (1998) Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information. European Economic Review, 42, (3-5), 583-592. (doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00116-5).
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Description/Abstract
Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper, I consider two possible bases for this concern – strategic trade and political economy considerations – and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 0014-2921 (print) |
| Related URLs: | |
| Keywords: | environmental policy, international trade, asymmetric information, political economy |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HF Commerce G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 33048 |
| Date Deposited: | 12 Dec 2007 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Jun 2011 14:13 |
| Contributors: | Ulph, Alistair (Author) |
| Date: | 31 May 1998 |
| Status: | Published |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33048 |
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