Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
Ulph, Alistair (1998) Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information. European Economic Review, 42, (3-5), 583-592. (doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00116-5).
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Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper, I consider two possible bases for this concern – strategic trade and political economy considerations – and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00116-5|
|Keywords:||environmental policy, international trade, asymmetric information, political economy|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||12 Dec 2007|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:30|
Trade liberalisation and global design of environmental policy
Funded by: ESRC (L320253227)
1 October 1996 to 30 September 1998
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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