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Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information

Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper, I consider two possible bases for this concern – strategic trade and political economy considerations – and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs.
environmental policy, international trade, asymmetric information, political economy
0014-2921
583-592
Ulph, Alistair
82a2f3b8-ac72-4d0e-85cc-2760eb99b117
Ulph, Alistair
82a2f3b8-ac72-4d0e-85cc-2760eb99b117

Ulph, Alistair (1998) Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information. European Economic Review, 42 (3-5), 583-592. (doi:10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00116-5).

Record type: Article

Abstract

Policy debates on trade and the environment frequently refer to a need for countries linked by trade to co-ordinate, or even harmonise, their purely domestic environmental policies. Underlying this argument is a concern that national governments will not fully internalise environmental externalities. Conventional trade models suggest this concern is unwarranted and harmonisation may be damaging. In this paper, I consider two possible bases for this concern – strategic trade and political economy considerations – and assess the implications for the design of policy and political institutions to achieve co-ordination. A model which links these two factors suggests a possible rationale for harmonisation of environmental policies, even when countries differ significantly with respect to environmental damage costs.

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More information

Published date: 31 May 1998
Keywords: environmental policy, international trade, asymmetric information, political economy

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33048
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33048
ISSN: 0014-2921
PURE UUID: 06d15762-53cc-4823-8544-d52d549a7d67

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Date deposited: 12 Dec 2007
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:41

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Author: Alistair Ulph

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