A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma


Ely, Jeffrey C. and Välimäki, Juuso (2002) A robust folk theorem for the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 102, (1), 84-105. (doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2774).

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Original Publication URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2774

Description/Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.

Item Type: Article
Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2774
ISSNs: 0022-0531 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Divisions : University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33053
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
Status
2002Published
Date Deposited: 15 May 2006
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 11:59
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33053

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