Squintani, Francesco and Valimaki, Juuso
Imitation and experimentation in changing contests.
Journal of Economic Theory, 104, (2), . (doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2889).
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This paper analyzes the equilibrium play of individuals that are randomly matched to play a contest where the dominant action changes over time. Under myopic decision making, players adopt imitation strategies similar to those observed in evolutionary models with sampling from past play in the population. If the players are patient, equilibrium strategies display elements of experimentation in addition to imitation. If the changes in the environment are infrequent enough, these strategies succeed in coordinating almost all of the players on the dominant action almost all of the time. The myopic rules, on the other hand, result in miscoordination for a positive fraction of time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, D83, D84.
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