Cost raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly

Mason, R. (1999) Cost raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9908).


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This paper provides a characterisation of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise their common cost. The dynamic analysis has two advantages over existing static models. First, it avoids conceptual weaknesses, allowing conjectures to be derived endogenously rather than imposed. Secondly, it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organisation (quantity and price adjustment, and learning-by-doing).

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions : University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33143
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
January 1999Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 20 Dec 2007
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 11:59

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