Optimal federal capital income taxation
Kotsogiannis, C. and Makris, M. (1998) Optimal federal capital income taxation. Southampton, GB, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 9820).
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Intergovernmental grants are not available to all federations. In this paper, optimal federal tax policies in a multileveled government framework are studied, when the federal authority has no access to intergovernmental grants, and the state governments implement the residence principle. A vertical fiscal externality exists. The federal government, using the available tax instruments, has a dual role; it corrects the inefficiences that arise from the non-cooperative behaviour of the state governments and also redistributes income. It is shown that there may exist a conflict in the redistributional considerations of the federal government and the achievement of production efficiency between the federation and the rest of the world.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2008|
|Last Modified:||27 Mar 2014 18:20|
|Publisher:||University of Southampton|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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