Contracts and productive information gathering


Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J-C. (1997) Contracts and productive information gathering. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9707).

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Description/Abstract

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state of nature, the agent has to incur a cost, (g) , to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, depending on the value of (g), incite the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study tradeoffs that are involved

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33181
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
Publisher: University of Southampton
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33181

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