Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered


Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9708).

Download

Full text not available from this repository.

Description/Abstract

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33182
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
Publisher: University of Southampton
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33182

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item