Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9708).
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Description/Abstract
In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Related URLs: | |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 33182 |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Jan 2008 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Mar 2012 13:49 |
| Contributors: | Cremer, J. (Author) Khalil, F. (Author) Rochet, J.-C. (Author) |
| Date: | January 1997 |
| Status: | Unpublished |
| Publisher: | University of Southampton |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33182 |
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