Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9708).


Full text not available from this repository.


In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions : University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33182
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
January 1997Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 25 Jan 2008
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 11:59

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item