Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
Cremer, J., Khalil, F. and Rochet, J.-C. (1997) Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9708).
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In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: he will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 2. we identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a "maybe informed" agent.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2008|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 13:49|
|Contributors:||Cremer, J. (Author)
Khalil, F. (Author)
Rochet, J.-C. (Author)
|Publisher:||University of Southampton|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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