Equilibria in networks
Hendricks, K., Piccione, M. and Tan, G. (1997) Equilibria in networks. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton (Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 9717).
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We study a model in which two carriers choose networks to connect cities and compete for travelling customers. We show that if carriers compete aggressively (e.g., Bertrand-like behavior), one carrier operating a single hub-spoke network is an equilibrium outcome. Competing hub-spoke networks are not an equilibrium outcome, although duopoly equilibria in non-hub networks can exist. If carriers do not compete aggressively, a duopoly equilibrium in hub-spoke networks exists if the number of cities is not small. We provide conditions under which all equilibria consist of hub-spoke networks.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||25 Jan 2008|
|Last Modified:||02 Mar 2012 13:06|
|Publisher:||University of Southampton|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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