Johal, Surjinder and Ulph, Alistair
Limiting political discretion and international environmental policy coordination with active lobbying. Southampton, UK, University of Southampton
(Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics, 0212).
We address two concerns: trade liberalisation may lead to a race-to-the bottom in environmental standards; supra-national agencies, who might overcome this, may be captured by special interest groups. This raises two sets of choices: whether to set environmental policy at the national or supra-national level, and whether to limit political discretion by agencies. In Johal and Ulph (2001a) we showed that policy should always be set at the supra- national level, whether or not political
discretion was limited, and that it would never pay to limit political discretion at the supra-national level unless it was also limited at the national level.
In that paper there were exogenous probabilities of agencies being captured by one group or another. In this paper the probabilities of capture depend on the lobbying efforts of interest groups. We show that the results of Johal and Ulph (2001a) are robust to the introduction of active lobbying.
||JEL classification: D72, F02, F12, F18, Q28
||strategic environmental policy, international policy coordination, supra-national
agencies, special interest groups, lobbying, limiting political discretion, constitutional choices
||J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|2002||Made publicly available|
||22 May 2006
||31 Mar 2016 11:59
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