Expressive constitutionalism


Brennan, Geoffery and Hamlin, Alan (2002) Expressive constitutionalism. Constitutional Political Economy, 13, (4), 299-311. (doi:10.1023/A:1020857219135).

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Original Publication URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1020857219135

Description/Abstract

We argue that the standard Constitutional Political Economy defence of constitutionalism, that derives from an argument relating to the shift from narrowly self-interested motivations in the in-period context to relatively general-interest decision making in the constitutional context, is flawed precisely because it is intended to relate to essentially political settings where decision making must be construed as collective in nature. We suggest an alternate account of expressive constitutionalism that points to a specific defence of constitutional conventions that are insulated from popular voting.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 1043-4062 (print)
Related URLs:
Keywords: constitution, expressive behaviour, collective choice
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33387
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33387

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