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Dividends, safety and liquidation when liabilities are long-term and stochastic

Dividends, safety and liquidation when liabilities are long-term and stochastic
Dividends, safety and liquidation when liabilities are long-term and stochastic
This paper investigates the optimal management of a firm faced with a long-term liability that occurs at a random date. Three issues are analysed: The optimal dividend policy; optimal expenditure on safety to delay the occurrence of the liability; and the optimal liquidation date of the firm. An owner faced with dynamic unlimited liability never liquidates and therefore accumulates capital to the golden rule level. For long-term liabilities, dividend payments and safety expenditure are non-decreasing over time.
The owner protected by limited liability may liquidate the firm in finite time in order to avoid paying the liability. If this is the case, then it accumulates less capital than the dynamic unlimited liability owner; and may decrease dividend payments and safety expenditure over time. The paper shows that a finite liquidation date is more likely to be optimal when the arrival rate of the liability occurrence increases over time.
liability, strategic liquidation, accumulative hazards
0014-2921
1179-1210
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61
Mason, Robin
c989f0e0-de54-495d-aeaf-75b42d62cb61

Mason, Robin (2004) Dividends, safety and liquidation when liabilities are long-term and stochastic. European Economic Review, 48 (6), 1179-1210. (doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.03.006).

Record type: Article

Abstract

This paper investigates the optimal management of a firm faced with a long-term liability that occurs at a random date. Three issues are analysed: The optimal dividend policy; optimal expenditure on safety to delay the occurrence of the liability; and the optimal liquidation date of the firm. An owner faced with dynamic unlimited liability never liquidates and therefore accumulates capital to the golden rule level. For long-term liabilities, dividend payments and safety expenditure are non-decreasing over time.
The owner protected by limited liability may liquidate the firm in finite time in order to avoid paying the liability. If this is the case, then it accumulates less capital than the dynamic unlimited liability owner; and may decrease dividend payments and safety expenditure over time. The paper shows that a finite liquidation date is more likely to be optimal when the arrival rate of the liability occurrence increases over time.

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More information

Published date: December 2004
Keywords: liability, strategic liquidation, accumulative hazards

Identifiers

Local EPrints ID: 33430
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33430
ISSN: 0014-2921
PURE UUID: 585659ad-0b51-48b8-b789-ec3b174ae0c9

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Date deposited: 16 May 2006
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 07:44

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Author: Robin Mason

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