Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly


Mason, Robin (2002) Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly. Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, (3), 317-336. (doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179).

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Original Publication URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00179

Description/Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.

Item Type: Article
ISSNs: 0022-1821 (print)
Related URLs:
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Divisions: University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 33432
Date Deposited: 16 May 2006
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2014 18:20
Contact Email Address: robin.mason@soton.ac.uk
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/33432

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