Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly
Mason, Robin (2002) Cost-raising strategies in a symmetric, dynamic duopoly. Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, (3), 317-336. (doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179).
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This paper provides a characterization of the set of dynamic models in which symmetric duopolists have incentives to raise a common cost. The advantage of the dynamic analysis over existing static models is that it extends the conditions (restrictive in static models) under which symmetric cost raising is profitable. The model is illustrated by standard examples from industrial organization: quantity and price adjustment, and learning–by–doing.
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI):||doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00179|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||16 May 2006|
|Last Modified:||06 Aug 2015 02:30|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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