The choice between market failures and corruption
Acemoglu, Daron and Verdier, Thierry (2000) The choice between market failures and corruption. American Economic Review, 90, (1), 194-211.
Full text not available from this repository.
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
|Divisions:||University Structure - Pre August 2011 > School of Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||20 Jul 2006|
|Last Modified:||27 Mar 2014 18:20|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
Actions (login required)