Electoral competition with local externalities
Ianni, Antonella (2012) Electoral competition with local externalities. Southampton, GB, University of Southampton, 20pp.
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We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We then analyze the implication that these ndings have in terms of space-time allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a winner-take-all election.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Other)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||24 May 2012 13:38|
|Last Modified:||02 Apr 2014 16:53|
Reinforcement Learning: Analytical Results and Methodology for Estimation
Funded by: ESRC (R000223704)
January 2002 to December 2003
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