Electoral competition with local externalities
Electoral competition with local externalities
We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We then analyze the implication that these findings have in terms of space-time allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a winner-take-all election.
University of Southampton
Ianni, Antonella
35024f65-34cd-4e20-9b2a-554600d739f3
22 May 2012
Ianni, Antonella
35024f65-34cd-4e20-9b2a-554600d739f3
Ianni, Antonella
(2012)
Electoral competition with local externalities
Southampton, GB.
University of Southampton
20pp.
Record type:
Monograph
(Project Report)
Abstract
We study a simple model of public opinion formation that posits that interaction between neighbouring agents leads to bandwagons in the dynamics of individual opinion choices, as well as in that of the aggregate process. We then analyze the implication that these findings have in terms of space-time allocation of fundings in an electoral campaign, where two candidates run in a winner-take-all election.
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Electoral_Competition_With_Local_Externalities.pdf
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Published date: 22 May 2012
Organisations:
Economics
Identifiers
Local EPrints ID: 339156
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339156
PURE UUID: be54f328-6282-4967-9bf5-00a36c1e19d2
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Date deposited: 24 May 2012 13:38
Last modified: 15 Mar 2024 02:51
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