Value and reasons to favour
Value and reasons to favour
This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
978-0-19-967804-4
27-49
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
July 2013
Way, Jonathan
2c3f95c6-ba9f-4640-b2f6-d23363a96c48
Way, Jonathan
(2013)
Value and reasons to favour.
In,
Shafer-Landau, Russ
(ed.)
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8.
(Oxford Studies in Metaethics)
Oxford, GB.
Oxford University Press, .
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Abstract
This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
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Published date: July 2013
Organisations:
Philosophy
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Local EPrints ID: 339159
URI: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339159
ISBN: 978-0-19-967804-4
PURE UUID: 8fc75995-f8d3-461f-bb53-a0a24d0ff36d
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Date deposited: 28 May 2013 08:35
Last modified: 14 Mar 2024 11:10
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Editor:
Russ Shafer-Landau
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