Survival of political leadership
Nurmikko, Sanna (2008) Survival of political leadership. Colchester, GB, University of Essex, 38pp.
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We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army's potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent's potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Discussion Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics
|Date Deposited:||28 May 2012 15:06|
|Last Modified:||28 May 2012 15:06|
|Contributors:||Nurmikko, Sanna (Author)
|Publisher:||University of Essex|
|RDF:||RDF+N-Triples, RDF+N3, RDF+XML, Browse.|
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