Survival of political leadership

Nurmikko, Sanna (2008) Survival of political leadership. Colchester, GB, University of Essex, 38pp.


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We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army's potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent's potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion Paper)
ISSNs: 1755-5361 (electronic)
Subjects: J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions : Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics
ePrint ID: 339245
Accepted Date and Publication Date:
May 2008Made publicly available
Date Deposited: 28 May 2012 15:06
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2016 14:28

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