Survival of political leadership
Nurmikko, Sanna (2008) Survival of political leadership. Colchester, GB, University of Essex, 38pp.
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Description/Abstract
We focus on political violence as a mechanism that allows the political leader to fight off opposition and increase his chances of re-election. In a collusive equilibrium, the leader allocates a bribe to the army, and the latter responds by producing political violence. Such an equilibrium is more likely, the larger are the public resources available to the leader; the lower is army's potential punishment and salary offered by the opposition regime; the more severe is the incumbent's potential punishment; and when the political leader is sufficiently patient, but the army is shortsighted enough.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| ISSNs: | 1755-5361 (electronic) |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social and Human Sciences > Social Sciences > Economics |
| Item ID: | 339245 |
| Date Deposited: | 28 May 2012 15:06 |
| Last Modified: | 28 May 2012 15:06 |
| Contributors: | Nurmikko, Sanna (Author) |
| Date: | May 2008 |
| Status: | Unpublished |
| Publisher: | University of Essex |
| URI: | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/id/eprint/339245 |
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